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Abstract: Do commodity price shocks have heterogeneous effect on countries
based on their export and import profiles? I address this question through a
panel study of 142 countries using Export and Import Indexes aimed at
differentiating the retail pass-through and fiscal balance channel of transmission
of Commodity Price shocks on inflation. The results show that an increase in the
Export Index leads to a decrease in contemporary inflation while an increase in
the Import Index leads to an increase in inflation in the next year. Average causal
mediating effect of the Export Index on Inflation through the Fiscal Balance was
shown to be negative.*
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1. Introduction
Inflation plays a big role in the lives of the poor around the world. The poor have
limited access to banking services, this leaves them unable to offset their losses to inflation.
Beck (2007) has found that people in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have significantly
lower access to banking services than people in Developed Countries. The recent episode of
hyperinflation in Zimbabwe ,as analyzed by Coomer (2011), is the most outrageous example of
government mismanagement of the money supply. Wines (2006) reports anecdotal evidence of
negative impacts on the residents of Zimbabwe. However one does not have to experience
hyperinflation to incur losses to welfare from inflation. Fujii (2013) found evidence that the poor
are especially vulnerable to inflation and especially food inflation. Easterly (2001) found in an
extensive survey that the poor name inflation as their top economic concern. Cardoso (1992)
argues that the poor in Latin American countries are not affected by inflation because their cash
holdings are too small.
In 2011 atleast 25 countries in the world experience double digit inflation according to
the World Bank and all of those countries are in the Developing World. This causes the poor to
lose purchasing power or change their purchasing decisions to offset inflation. The poor, in the
absence of banking services, may choose to buy consumer durables to offset inflation. Even this
move will still net them a loss in welfare as the consumer durable good earns a negative return
equal to its depreciation. Easterly (2001) found that inflation reduced the real wage of the poor
and states that inflation is a “cruel tax” on the poor.
The earliest look at inflation was done by Phillips (1958) who found a relationship
between inflation and unemployment in the United States between 1861 and 1958. This finding
was embraced by the Keynesian economists of the early half of the 20th century. However the
hyperinflation of the 1970s in the United States and the complete breakdown of the Phillips
curve in empirical testing after 1960s opened the door for the Quantity Theory of Money. Gali
(1999) and other economists are still trying to revive the idea of the Phillips curve.
The dominant theory on inflation today considers it as purely a monetary phenomenon.
This theory is based on the Quantity Theory of Money and was brought back to attention by
Friedman (1953). This theory says that the only determinants of the inflation rate are the
relative supply of money and goods in the economy. Friedman also suggested a constant money
supply growth rule to help combat inflation.
Beginning roughly in the 1990s the world has experienced a noticeable drop in inflation
rates among all countries. This caused the policymakers and academics to look for the cause of
this change. Some speculated that the adoption of the Taylor Rule, introduced in Taylor (1993),
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was the cause of this drop in inflation around the world. Alesina and Summers (1993) believed
it was the heterogeneity in central bank independence that could explain this sudden change.
Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) argued that increased openness of the economy also increased
the cost of unexpected inflation and therefore reduced the temptation to engage in excessive
money supply increases. The famous Lucas (1976) critique of backward looking economic
models created a new paradigm in economic models of inflation.
With the introduction of forward-looking expectations money supply alone cannot be
sufficient in explaining the inflation dynamics of many countries. To this line of thought
Sargent and Wallace (1981) predicted that the ability of the monetary policy to target inflation
may only be effective with coordination with fiscal side of economic policy. Sargent and Wallace
(1981) predicted that tight monetary policy could lead to a higher inflation rate under certain
conditions. With a given demand for government bonds and no changes in future fiscal policy
some of the debt has to be inflated away using seigniorage.
Related to Sargent and Wallace (1981) is the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, which
was developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994). The Fiscal Theory of the
Price Level argues that an increase in government deficits has an effect on the price level.
Empirical work in Catao (2005) showed a strong association between deficits and inflation
among high inflation developing countries.
Inflation plays a big role in the decision making function of households, individuals and
companies. One such example is the impact of inflation in lowering real wages and reducing
rigidity in wages of labor markets. Wage rigidity was shown to be nominal in nature and only
reduced by inflation. Nominal inflation was shows not to decrease even in times of drought.
Thus workers were unwilling to accept lower wages even in tough times. (Kaur 2012)
Therefore inflation serves a very important function in reducing unemployment during
recessions. Inflation was shows to “ grease the wheels” of labor markets as predicted by Tobin
(1972). One way through which inflation influences the decision making of poor individuals
could be the propagation effect of price shocks in a specific product group. Propagation happens
when a price hike in one product group also affects the prices in other product groups. Pedersen
(2010) found that price shocks in food products resulted in higher propagation than price
shocks in energy products, also emerging countries are more affected by propagation than
advanced.
Commodity price increases may not even lead to inflation in every case. In this seminal
paper Mankiw (1985) set forth the model which looks at the effect of “menu costs” on the
pricing decisions of firms based on an increase in underlying costs. “Menu cost” is the cost of
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printing a new menu or the cost of changing the price of the firm’s product in every outlet.
This cost has an effect on the firm’s decision to change the price of its product based on the
increase in underlying costs. Therefore firms may or may not shift the higher cost to consumers
based on the degree of price increase. There is extensive literature in microeconomics that
looks at the ways that companies shift the increasing costs of raw commodities to the
customers, which results in inflation. This argument was extended by Christiano et al. (2005)
who looked at the impact of expansionary monetary policy shock on marginal output.
Christiano et al.(2005) determined that staggered wage contracts and variable capital utilization
impacted the degree to which inflation expectations were driving changes in real marginal
costs. Rigobon (2010) used micro price data to test how much of the underlying raw material
cost increases was passed on to customers. Rigobon (2010) found that sectors responded
differently across countries and commodities. Therefore different characteristics of each sector
have an impact on the pass through of commodity price shocks.
Exporting countries may be affected differently by a rise in underlying costs compared
to net raw commodity importers. This may not be a simple case of higher raw inputs leading to
higher inflation for every country. Zoli (2009) found that international commodity price shocks
have a significant impact on domestic inflation, however the effect of commodity price shocks
was asymmetric to inflation in a panel of 18 European countries. Previous studies of
commodity prices looked at the retail pass-through channel and assumed homogeneous effects
on inflation and could not reach a consensus. Awokuse and Yang (2002), Cutler et
al.(2005) and Jumah and Kunst (2007) found that commodity prices do affect inflation while
Blomberg and Harris (1995), and Furlong and Ingenito (1996) found that commodity prices do
not affect inflation.
Previous work on commodity prices focused on growth rates Deaton (1999) and the
Resource Curse Auty (1993). My approach also differs from existing literature on budget
deficits and inflation (Elmendorf,1993; Catao and Terrones, 2005) by introducing
heterogeneous effects of commodity price shocks on inflation and budget deficits through the
Export Index and the Import Index approach. The intuition behind this approach is that a rise
in the price of a certain commodity will only have an effect on the country's inflation rate if the
country exports or imports that commodity.
Using this approach I find that an increase in the Export Index leads to a decrease in
the inflation rate, while an increase in the Import Index leads to an increase in the inflation rate.
The Export Index has a negative contemporary effect on the inflation rate through the Fiscal
Balance channel. The Import Index has a positive effect on the inflation rate in the following
4

year through the retail pass-through channel. The effect of the Export Index varies by the
country's income group level and by the level of inflation in the country.
Following this introduction, Section 2 of my paper presents a description of the
methodology and the econometrics model used in this paper. Section 3 describes the data used
in this paper. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 summarizes and concludes.

2. Methodology
2.1 Commodity Price Index
At the core of my approach is the Commodity Price Index. In this paper I am following
the methodology first used by Deaton (1999). I construct a country specific commodity Export
and Import Price Index that captures exogenous shocks to commodity prices :
CommodityIndexi,t = ∏cϵC ComPricec,tθi,c
where ComPricec,t is the price of commodity c in year t. θi,c is the average export or import
weight assigned to each commodity. These weights are based on the time invariant value of
exports or imports of a commodity in the GDP of the country i. This functional form of the
commodity price index follows common practice in the literature, for example Collier(2007).
Using this approach I can create a unique index that captures the relative value of Exports or
Imports to each country. This allows me to introduce heterogeneous effects to the underlying
changes in global commodity prices by differentiating between the retail pass-through channel
of import commodity prices and the impact of export commodity prices on the inflation rate. I
used time invariant weights to get around the limitations of the data and also to establish a
unique profile of a country that is based on the average amount of a commodity
exported/imported as a share of GDP over 30 years. I created the index using local currency
and US dollars to test if the variation in the Index is coming from price changes in the
underlying commodities or changes in the exchange rate. Following Deaton (1999) the
commodities in question are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, iron, maize, oil,
rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat and wood.
2.2 Estimation Strategy
To examine heterogeneous effects of commodity prices on inflation, I estimate the
following econometric model where the within-country change in the log of the Consumer
Price Index (∆logCPIi,t) is related to the within-country change in the log of the Export
(∆logExportIndexi,t) and the Import Index (∆logImportIndexi,t):
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∆logCPIi,t=γ1∆ logCPIi,t-1+γ2 ∆logExportIndexi,t+γ3 ∆logExportIndexi,t-1 +γ4
∆logImportIndexi,t+γ5 ∆logImportIndexi,t-1 +γ6 ∆logManufacturedIndext +γ7∆
logManufacturedIndext-1 + γ8∆ logExchangeRatei,t + γ9∆ logM2i,t + γ10 ∆logM2i,t-1
+γ11∆logGDPGapi,t +αi +βt +μ i,t
In the above equation the inflation rate of a country is defined as the log change in CPI. α
i

are country fixed effects that capture time invariant country specific unobserved variables and

βt are year fixed effects that capture common year shocks. μ i,t is the error term clustered at the
country level. I use the change of the log of the Export/Import Indexes to ensure that withincountry variations in the Export/Import Indexes are due to percentage changes in the local
currency commodity prices. Manufactured Goods Index is a measurement of the import price
of manufactured goods and is calculated in US dollars. GDP Gap , M2 , Exchange Rate , CPI
and the Export/Import Indexes are calculated in local currency.
In the baseline regression I estimate the average marginal effect of commodity price
fluctuations on CPI inflation by using the largest possible sample size. Later I split up the
sample by income groups and level of inflation to test for heterogeneity in the marginal effects.

3. Data:
Data on annual international commodity prices for the 1970-2009 period was obtained
from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics (UNCTAD,2009). Data on the value of Commodity
Exports and Imports is from NBER-United Nations Trade Database (Feenstra et al., 2004).
Commodities used in the index are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, iron,
maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat and wood. For some commodities multiple
prices were listed, I used a simple average of those prices. Data on the price of iron was not
available for 2010-2013 years, this reduced my sample time frame to 1970-2009. Additionally
the data on commodity Exports/Imports had multiple entries for some commodities, only the
category describing raw commodities was used. The methodology by Deaton (1999) called for
using the average time invariant weights, this helped overcome some missing data problems in
the value of Exports/Imports database. NBER-United Nations Trade Database does not report
zero values, thus one cannot differentiate between missing values and 0 commodities
Exported/Imported. Additionally I tested for changes in the export profile of a country
through time by creating an index based on export weights in the 1990s. The results were
similar to the index using the average of 1970-2000 annual weights. Table 2 presents the
country list and the sum of Export weights for that country. Resource rich countries have
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highest weights in the sample, while a developed country like the United States has weights
close to 0.
Macroeconomic data is mostly from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database
of the IMF. Additionally data from World Bank's World Development Indicators was used. The
data set covers 142 countries and up to 38 annual observations per country. The definition of
money supply is M2. Fiscal Balance data is from Catao (2005). Fiscal Balance data from the
IMF only included deficit data from the central government and did not include state or local
governments. Using more comprehensive data from Catao (2005) increased my Fiscal Balance
observations from 1400 to 2800.

4. Results:
3.1 Main results
Table 3 shows the main results. In this table all variables are in log changes and local
currency, except for the Manufactured Goods index which is in US dollars. The coefficients on
the Manufactured Goods Index and the first lag of the Manufactured Goods Index is positive
and significant at 1%. This suggests that an increase in the cost of manufactured goods leads to
an increase in inflation. This finding is consistent with economic theory and expectations. The
coefficient on the Exchange Rate is positive and significant, this suggests that an increase in the
Exchange Rate is associated with an increase in the inflation rate. This is consistent with
economic theory and is significant with the addition of other covariates. The changes in M2 is
correlated with an increase in the inflation rate in both contemporary and next years. This
result confirms the monetary theory of the money supply as the main driver of inflation. The
first lag of the inflation rate is added to capture any possible omitted variables, this follows the
methodology of Kwon (2008).
The coefficient on the log of the Export Index is negative in the contemporary case and
is not significant in the first lag. This suggests that an increase in the Export Commodity
Index is associated with a reduction in the inflation rate in the current year. This result
suggests that the Price of Exported Commodities affects inflation differently from the Price of
Imported Commodities. The coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level even with the
addition of covariates.
The coefficient on the log of the Import Index is positive and significant in column 3 of
Table 3. The coefficient of the first lag of the Import Index is positive and significant at 5%
level. This result is consistent with the retail pass-through channel of transmission of Import
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Commodity Prices on inflation in a country. This result also confirms heterogeneous effect of
commodity prices on inflation based on the Export/Import profile of that country. However
this result is not significant when the first lag of the inflation rate is added in column 4 and 5.
The regressions in Table 3 have between 4011 and 3783 observations with the number of
countries ranging from 141 to 138. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects have been used
to test for country specific and year specific shocks to inflation. The high R-squared suggests
that the model is properly specified. Additionally the time trend was introduced to capture and
reduction in global inflation due to the time trend.
Table 4 uses the Export and Import Indexes in US dollar currency to test whether the
results in Table 3 come from changes in the underlying price of the commodities or the change
in the relative Exchange Rates of each country. The coefficients on the Export Index are
similar and significant at 1% level. The different size of the coefficient can be explained by the
different base of the US Dollar and the Local Currency Indexes. The coefficient on the Import
Index is significant only at the 10% level now, before the inclusion of the first lag of inflation.
Table 5 breaks down the sample into four different income groups based on the
classification by the World Bank. The local currency Export Index has a negative coefficient in
Lower Income , Middle Income and High Income OECD countries, but is not significant in the
High Income non OECD group. This suggests that Low and Middle Income countries
experienced reduction in their inflation rates when their Export Index increased. However this
effect disappears in the High Income non OECD case. This can be explained by the make of
countries in the High Income non OECD group, which consists mostly of wealthy oil
exporting countries in the Middle East, Russia and are known for their weak institutional
quality.
Table 7 breaks down the sample by their inflation rates. The results show that countries
with highest observed inflation rates experience the largest effects of Export Index on
inflation. This is consistent with the deficit channel of mediation, as theory suggests that
countries that have large and chronic deficits experience high inflation. Countries that generally
have low levels of inflation they are not likely to be affected by the Export Index. The
coefficient of the Export Index in column 4 and 5 differ greatly in size. This suggests that most
of the result comes from countries that have large and chronic deficits, which improve their
Fiscal Balance by using commodity Export revenue.
Table 6 shows that Fiscal Balance is the most likely channel of mediation in the Export
Index case. Fiscal Balance is defined as Deficits/Surplus as a share of GDP in local currency. I
assume that Export Commodity Prices are exogenous for most countries in the sample, as small
8

countries that export raw commodities do not have enough market power to influence the price
of a commodity. Figure 1 shows a diagram of the Fiscal Balance channel and explains how an
exogenous change in the price of an export commodity can lead to an increase in the Fiscal
Balance of a country. An improvement in the Fiscal Balance of a country then reduces inflation
as shown by Catao (2005). Column 1 of Table 6 shows that an improvement in the Fiscal
Balance leads to a reduction in the inflation rate in the current year. Column 2 of Table 6 shows
that an exogenous increase in the Export Index leads to an improvement in the Fiscal Balance.
Using methodology by Imai (2011) in American Political Science Review the Average Causal
Mediating Effect (ACME) was calculated using the coefficient multiplication approach.
Assuming Sequential Ignorability and No-Interaction assumptions ACME is asymptotically
consistent and equal to -0.02. Figure 2 shows that ACME is negative and significant at the ρ=0.
Sequential Ignorability is a valid assumption in the Fiscal Balance channel as all arrows point
outward from the Fiscal Balance except for the Export Index.

5. Summary and Conclusions
Commodity prices were shown to have heterogeneous effects on inflation rates based on
the Export and Import profile of each country. Countries that experience an increase in their
Export Index were shown to experience a decrease in their inflation rate. Countries that
experienced an increase in their Import Index last year were shown to experience an increase in
their inflation rate current year. This confirms the retail pass-through channel for the import
case. For the export case Fiscal Balance was shown to have a negative Average Causal
Mediating Effect on inflation. The effect of the Export Index on inflation varies by the
country's income level , institutional quality and the overall level of inflation.
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Figure 1: Exports Affect Inflation Through the Fiscal Balance Channel

Figure 2: Average Causal Mediating Effect Sensitivity Test
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations Currency

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Economic Variables:
Inflation

4446

Local Currency

0.1446619

0.3255697

-0.1940755

5.475339

5398
5398
5363

Local Currency
US Dollars
Local Currency

0.0144078
0.0053202
0.0044073

0.0934506
0.045106
0.0351747

-1.963419
-0.3999
-0.6074882

3.100665
0.7624545
1.328035

5398
5559
5398
4725
2541
2878

US Dollars
US Dollars
Local Currency
Local Currency
Local Currency
Local Currency

0.0025645
3.817188
0.0999363
0.2012442
-2.974909
-3.733362

0.0335677
6.566289
0.402206
0.331344
2.747968
4.871619

-0.6074882
-6.202695
-6.907711
-6.173557
-12.16874
-41.2208

1.276211
21.86495
8.83407
4.837324
3.659877
18.2693

5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559
5559

US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars
US Dollars

1433.646
98.44349
78.12024
100.094
2375.438
132.7523
25.4639
357.4106
33.47179
546.3029
304.055
1028.991
10.66829
2660.281
153.4065

519.1424
19.72729
32.62162
42.43009
1502.586
32.11618
19.49223
193.1355
23.83855
253.2249
113.987
480.7345
5.446826
714.8834
50.05078

589.6083
59.16167
24.43
43.63083
1070.592
28.7208
2.11
35.93833
9.84
123.2994
129
332.4677
3.674167
1055.333
54.84167

2637.799
130.9417
171.8567
229.2125
7117.229
205.335
97.01667
973.0044
134.41
998.4103
700.1667
2618.299
29.70167
4235.284
343.2042

Log Export Index
Log Export Index
Log Import Index
Log Import Index
Log Manufactured Goods Index
Log Exchange Rate
Log M2
GDP Gap
Fiscal Balance /GDP
Commodity Prices:
Aluminum
Beef
Cocoa
Coffee
Copper
Cotton
Oil
Gold
Iron
Wood
Rice
Rubber
Sugar
Tobacco
Wheat
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Table 2: List of Countries in the Sample and a measure of Commodity Exports/GDP ratio.
Country
Country
Country
Country
Oman
0.6
Syria
0.111 Azerbaijan
0.038 Lithuania
0.007
Qatar
0.587 Ghana
0.111 Sudan
0.036 Poland
0.007
Angola
0.475 Uganda
0.111 Australia
0.034 Bahamas
0.006
Guyana
0.454 Papua N.Guin 0.11 Mexico
0.034 Malta
0.006
Kuwait
0.446 Ecuador
0.089 Ireland
0.033 Hungary
0.006
Saudi Arabia
0.445 Guatemala
0.086 Ethiopia
0.029 India
0.005
Nigeria
0.369 Seychelles
0.085 Malawi
0.023 Gambia
0.005
Suriname
0.356 Tajikistan
0.084 New Zealand 0.023 Finland
0.005
Iraq
0.345 Honduras
0.084 Philippines
0.023 Croatia
0.005
Congo
0.342 Egypt
0.084 Pakistan
0.022 Slovenia
0.005
Gabon
0.342 Costa Rica
0.081 Burkina Faso 0.022 Senegal
0.004
St.Kt-Nev-An
0.288 Togo
0.08 Bolivia
0.021 Romania
0.004
Zambia
0.284 Burundi
0.078 Cambodia
0.021 Mongolia
0.004
Untd Arab Em 0.28 Norway
0.074 Brazil
0.02 Israel
0.004
Liberia
0.27 Viet Nam
0.072 Ukraine
0.02 Switz.Liecht 0.004
Libya
0.267 Dominican Rp 0.071 Canada
0.02 Albania
0.004
Yemen
0.259 GuineaBissau 0.07 Zimbabwe
0.019 Nepal
0.004
Eq.Guinea
0.239 Colombia
0.068 Kyrgyzstan
0.019 Czech Rep
0.003
Iran
0.231 Chad
0.061 Sri Lanka
0.019 Djibouti
0.003
Cote Divoire
0.194 Cent.Afr.Rep 0.057 Estonia
0.018 Jordan
0.003
Guinea
0.164 Mali
0.053 Panama
0.017 Sweden
0.003
Mauritius
0.161 Sierra Leone 0.051 Niger
0.016 Bosnia Herzg 0.003
Belize
0.155 Benin
0.051 Bahrain
0.016 Korea Rep.
0.003
Kazakhstan
0.145 Latvia
0.05 Mozambique 0.015 Slovakia
0.003
Trinidad Tbg
0.144 Paraguay
0.05 South Africa 0.014 Armenia
0.003
Cameroon
0.144 Singapore
0.048 Netherlands 0.014 Belarus
0.002
Malaysia
0.143 Rwanda
0.048 UK
0.014 USA
0.002
Venezuela
0.141 Kenya
0.046 Bulgaria
0.013 Cyprus
0.002
Algeria
0.14 Thailand
0.046 Samoa
0.012 Italy
0.001
Fiji
0.131 Tunisia
0.044 Argentina
0.011 Morocco
0.001
Jamaica
0.13 Peru
0.043 Georgia
0.011 Lebanon
0
El Salvador
0.121 Madagascar
0.043 China
0.009 Iceland
0
Nicaragua
0.119 Barbados
0.043 Denmark
0.009 Japan
0
Indonesia
0.117 Russian Fed 0.042 Lao P.Dem.R 0.008 Bangladesh
0
Dem.Rp.Congo 0.115 Tanzania
0.04 Turkey
0.008
Mauritania
0.111 Uruguay
0.04 Haiti
0.007
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Table 3. Effect of Commodity Price Shocks on Inflation
Local Currency Index
---OLS Estimates, Clustered Standard Errors--Dependent Variable: Inflation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Exports
Δ Log Export Index

(5)

-0.460***
(0.0959)
0.0202
(0.0597)

-0.486***
(0.103)
0.0328
(0.0623)

-0.486***
(0.103)
0.0328
(0.0623)

-0.476***
(0.106)
-0.0179
(0.0702)

-0.476***
(0.106)
-0.0179
(0.0702)

-0.0336
(0.0453)
Δ Log Import Index, t-1
0.0859**
(0.0409)
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index
0.0155***
(0.00226)
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index, t-1 0.0746***
(0.0128)
Δ Log Exchange Rate
0.489***
(0.0328)
Δ Log M2
0.306***
(0.0288)
Δ Log M2, t-1
0.216***
(0.0227)
GDP Gap

-0.0409
(0.0459)
0.0807**
(0.0401)
0.0133**
(0.00543)
0.054
(0.0386)
0.496***
(0.0338)
0.305***
(0.0295)
0.214***
(0.0232)
-0.00818
(0.0136)

-0.0409
(0.0459)
0.0807**
(0.0401)
0.00841***
(0.00130)
0.0116***
(0.00218)
0.496***
(0.0338)
0.305***
(0.0295)
0.214***
(0.0232)
-0.00818
(0.0136)
0.000943
(0.000866)

-0.0469
(0.0450)
0.0237
(0.0396)
0.0161***
(0.00558)
0.0749*
(0.0392)
0.482***
(0.0358)
0.293***
(0.0310)
0.125***
(0.0193)
-0.00121
(0.0139)

-0.0469
(0.0450)
0.0237
(0.0396)
0.00875***
(0.00133)
0.0109***
(0.00210)
0.482***
(0.0358)
0.293***
(0.0310)
0.125***
(0.0193)
-0.00121
(0.0139)
0.00142
(0.000883)
0.132***
(0.0341)
-0.146***
(0.0227)
3783
138
0.906
YES
YES

Δ Log Export Index, t-1
Imports
Δ Log Import Index

Trend
Inflation, t-1
Constant

-0.540***
(0.0903)

-0.419*
(0.239)

-0.159***
(0.0236)

0.132***
(0.0341)
-0.539**
(0.243)

Observations
Number of Countries
R-squared
Country FE
Year FE
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4011
141
0.898
YES
YES

3818
140
0.901
YES
YES

3818
140
0.901
YES
YES

3783
138
0.906
YES
YES
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Table 6. Fiscal Balance Channel of Mediation
Local Currency Index
---OLS Estimates, Clustered Standard Errors--Dependent Variable: Inflation
Dependent Variable: Fiscal Balance
(1)
(2)
Exports
Δ Log Export Index
Δ Log Export Index, t-1

-0.566**
(0.266)
-0.16
(0.115)

11.78***
(3.171)

Imports
Δ Log Import Index

-0.05
(0.0374)
Δ Log Import Index, t-1
0.00474
(0.0339)
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index
0.0144**
(0.00656)
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index, t-1 -0.00109
(0.00313)
Δ Fiscal Balance
-0.00201**
(0.000815)
Δ Log Exchange Rate
0.508***
(0.0388)
Δ Log M2
0.331***
(0.0435)
Δ Log M2, t-1
0.120***
(0.0249)
GDP Gap
-0.00543
(0.00689)
Trend
0.00485*
(0.00277)
Inflation, t-1
0.101**
(0.0398)
Constant
-0.155**
(0.0778)
Observations
Number of Countries
R-squared
Country FE
Year FE
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2087
84
0.939
YES
YES

-3.214***
(0.570)

-3.192***
(0.563)
2801
96
0.418
YES
YES

Table 7. Effect of Commodity Price Shocks on Inflation
Local Currency Index
---OLS Estimates, Clustered Standard Errors--Dependent Variable: Inflation
Low
High
(1)
(2)
Exports
Δ Log Export Index
Δ Log Export Index, t-1
Imports
Δ Log Import Index

0.0214
(0.0280)
0.0555
(0.0347)

0.0183
(0.0168)
Δ Log Import Index, t-1
0.00676
(0.0176)
Observations
1830
Number of Countries
65
Average Inflation Level
Low
R-squared
0.586
Country FE
YES
Year FE
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.673***
(0.129)
0.0293
(0.0878)
-0.502
(0.612)
-0.0894
(0.469)
1953
73
High
0.915
YES
YES

Appendix
My study looks at the impact of commodity prices changes on the inflation rates of a
panel of 140 countries. This Appendix focuses on a single country, Chile, and for this reason is
qualitative in nature. This case study will focus on the two driving narratives of Chile's
economic history in the last 40 years, “super cycle” in the price of copper and elite capture.
Chile has been the exception to the global failure of “neoliberal” economic policies around the
world. This exceptionalism was shaped by limited political diversity, protection of the
“neoliberal” model from criticism at the cost of equality and individual rights. These policies
contributed to Chile's high per capita income growth in the past 40 years. The 2008 financial
crisis and the perceived failure of laissez-faire financial reforms in the United States, the cradle
of neoliberal policies, shook the public's faith in “free market” capitalism domestically and also
globally. This was the impetus for a host of social movements in Chile aimed to challenge the
past neoliberal policies.
A.1 Introduction to Chile
Chile is located in South America and stretches along the western coast of the continent
from Peru to the southernmost tip of South America. Chile is a mountainous country with
large supplies of natural-resources and natural ports on its western coast that enabled its
colonization by European settlers. The most abundant natural-resource of Chile are its copper
reserves, that are mostly located in the northern Atacama Desert. A second notable resource of
Chile is wine that is grown in the Central Valley of Chile, located in the middle of the country.
The capital of the country is Santiago and is located in the Central Valley of Chile. The
residents are segregated into wealthy and poor neighborhoods with a glittering downtown
featuring many shiny skyscrapers. Chile also ranks highly on many indexes used to measure a
country's progress, like per capita GDP and the “ease of doing business”. In 2010 Chile became
a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This
ascension of a largely developing country into an exclusive club of wealthy countries is odd
considering the stark level of inequality and political restriction that still exist in Chile. All
these perceived signals of progress are hiding the pervasive inequality in the country. The view
from those skyscrapers overlooks poverty, the per capita GDP is driven mostly by the high
income elite, and the “ease of doing business” does not look at the welfare of the workers.
While the official poverty rate is 15%, it relies on an outdated survey and a recent study by
Larrain (2008) finds that the true poverty rate is roughly double the official rate. It is unlikely
that the government will update its survey
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Copper exports play a huge role in Chile, accounting for half of all exports in 2010.
The copper export sector is dominated by international firms which pay royalty and taxes on
their earnings. The state copper exporter CODELCO was downsized as part of the neoliberal
policy of privatization. This means that majority of the profits from copper exports accrue to
foreign firms. The copper export sector does not create any jobs downstream from it, because it
is a raw commodity exporter. Most of the supplies for the copper export sector are provided by
foreign firms and mostly comprise machinery. The sustainability of this finite natural resource
exporting strategy is questionable. For this reason Chile ranks poorly in most indexes that
cover Environmental Sustainability.
The modern Chilean political narrative begins with the election of Eduardo Frei
Montalva of the “Christian Democrats” in 1964. This centrist candidate started policies to
nationalize the mostly United States owned copper companies, agrarian reform and overall
progressive social policies. During this time all of South America was under the influence of
socialist rhetoric from the Soviet Union and this mobilized the peasants, urban residents ,
students and labor activists to create the alliance of socialists, Unidad Popular. Their candidate
in the 1970 election was Salvador Allende. Upon election Allende embarked on a policy of
“Chilean socialism” aimed to nationalize large industry and especially the copper industry.
Allende's policy of nationalism and fiscal expansion was financed by seigniorage and resulted
in high inflation. These movements were perceived by the United States government and
wealthy Chileans as paving the way for a socialist country. With the country embargoed by the
United States and dissatisfaction with the new policies high at home, Chile was prime for a coup
to swing the pendulum to the other extreme of the political spectrum.
Pinochet was the chief of the armed forces when he overthrew Allende on September
11 1973. Acting on a perceived Soviet threat to Chile , Pinochet enacted a policy of brutal
crackdown on any forms of dissent to his rule. Scores of opposition activists were abducted
and murdered by the Chilean military and secret police.
To implement economic reform Pinochet turned to the United States and the University
of Chicago in particular. 25 Chilean nationals trained at the University of Chicago were
recruited into key government positions. They implemented the newly developed neoliberal
ideas of macroeconomic discipline, abolition of price controls and deregulating markets and
industry. These reforms lowered the inflation rate and increased the GDP growth rate of the
economy. Inflation rate went from 340% in 1975 to 9% in 1981. In 1982 Chile had developed
large Current Account deficits and experienced a financial crisis. This resulted in a drop in
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aggregate consumption and aggregate investment. The 1982 financial crisis and the ensuing
recession combined to decrease real wages , increase poverty and unemployment in the country.
The government's reaction was to drop the fixed exchange rate of the Chilean peso versus the
US dollar on recommendation from Milton Friedman. This increased the public debt of the
country overnight and negatively affected companies that borrowed in US dollars. The overall
cost to the Chilean government of the 1982 financial crisis was roughly 40% of the GDP.
For his sins Pinochet was never indicted or jailed. He was placed under house arrest in
1998 on a visit to the United Kingdom. Later Pinochet was extradited back to Chile where was
intermittently under house arrest but was not indicted for any crimes during his presidency.
Aside from being inconvenienced Pinochet escaped justice and died in 2006 a free man. The
decision not to charge Pinochet in Chile for his crimes illustrates the power of Pinochet's
powerbase and the complicity of those currently in power in the same crimes.
In the 1988 a referendum was called to decide whether Pinochet could serve another 8
year term as president. Upon Pinochet's defeat Chile was now on a path to democracy. The first
freely elected president was Patricio Aylwin from the Christian Democrat party. The transition
from military dictatorship to democracy rested on the guarantee that neoliberal economic
policy would be sustained and those responsible for the crackdown and repression would not be
prosecuted. The new government however did increase the minimum wage, public expenditure
on services and infrastructure. Aylwin administration can be described as relatively left leaning.
The following cycle Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle of the Christian Democrats was elected
president in 1993. The Frei administration can be described as relatively right leaning. Frei
embarked on a policy of privatization of the water sector and further integration of Chile into
the world economy. Chile entered the World Trade Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Group, MERCOSUR and signed free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico.
In 2000 a nominally socialist Ricardo Lagos won the presidency. His policies were
largely neoliberal, with the exception of public health care reform aimed at lower class people.
In 2006 Lagos was succeeded by Michelle Bachelet of the Socialist Party. Although a socialist
who was jailed in the 1970s for her political activism, Bachelet embarked on similar neoliberal
economic policy as her predecessors. Her biggest contribution to social welfare in Chile was her
reform of the social security system to expand eligibility.
The constitution of Chile was created in 1980 under the military dictatorship and thus
restricts the amount of influence the voters have on the legislature and the overall direction of
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the country. The practice of appointed senators was nominally eliminated by constitutional
reforms in 2005, however the practice exists in practice. This is another example of the long
reach of the Pinochet regime on the future of Chile.
A.2 Macroeconomy of Chile

Figure 4.1 from Solimano(2012) shows the GDP and the per capita GDP for Chile.
Notable changes in the trend are the coup of 1973, financial crisis of 1982 and the “Chilean
miracle” which started in 1985 and resulted in a sharp increase in the GDP growth rate. The
high growth rate was interrupted by the Asian Financial crisis of 1997 and more recently by
the Global Financial crisis of 2008.
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Table 4.1 from Solimano(2012) lists the key macroeconomic variables on Chile. Notably the
Terms of Trade and inflation variables offer evidence for my main thesis that Export
Commodity Price Increases result in a decrease in CPI inflation. For Chile in the 1986-1997
period the Terms of Trade was 98.4 with the inflation rate of 14.5% and in the 1998-2009
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period the Terms of Trade was 143.2 with inflation rate of 3.4%. In the case of Chile an
increase in the price of copper resulted in a reduction in domestic CPI inflation.
The accelerated growth in GDP of Chile was driven by political stability and an
increased integration to global markets through free trade agreements. This sharp increase in
per capita GDP did not translate fully into an improvement for the poor. Overall the Chilean
Macroeconomy was guided by the “Washington Consensus”. Taxes of capital inflows, managed
exchange rates and reduction in inflation were practiced ever since the Pinochet regime took
power. Near the end of the Pinochet regime the central bank of Chile was established with
protections from political pressure and the mandate to maintain low inflation. The managed
exchange rate mechanism was dropped for a flexible exchange rate mechanism in 1999. The
Concertacion governments of pre 2000s focused mainly on economic growth at the expense of
income equality and the environment. The more socialist government from 2000 onward
engaged in a policy of Fiscal Surpluses, Bachelet especially set up a fund in 2006 to capture
surpluses from copper exports with the aim of engaging in counter cyclical fiscal spending.
This fund was used by Bachelet to fund public welfare spending, like assistance to middle
income house buyers. Following Table 4.5 From Solimano (2012) shows the different changes
in Fiscal and Monetary policy of Chile.
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Chile adopted a policy of non-intervention in the exchange rates and thus has
experienced higher variation in the nominal exchange rates in the 2000-2009 period. This
increased volatility in exchange rates , not focusing on unemployment are some of the
drawbacks of the Chilean approach to monetary policy with the sole goal of inflation targeting.
A.3 Inequality and Poverty
The Gini coefficient for Chile has been above 50 and constant through the last 20 years.
Transition back to democracy, increases in GDP and per capita GDP did not affect the Gini
coefficient and the underlying inequality in Chile. The constitution crafted under Pinochet and
general low levels of empowerment reduce the amount of influence ordinary people have on
public policy. This results in a lack of social services like public pensions, healthcare and good
schooling.
Transition back to democracy and the election of nominal socialist leaders did not
result in any effects to implement redistribution. The topic of wealth redistribution may still be
contentious in Chile and thus the successive governments decided instead to focus on poverty
reduction, instead of tackling the underlying causes of inequality.
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Table 5.1 from Solimano (2012) shows the reduction in poverty and acute poverty in
Chile. The recent economic prosperity and social programs targeted at the poor were successful
in lowering the overall and the acute rates of poverty. These numbers are uplifting, however
the methodology for calculating the official poverty rate was questioned by Larrain (2008).
Additionally getting out of poverty is not permanent for all households in Chile. Lopez (2008)
showed that a large part of the population is only slightly above the poverty line and any large
exogenous shock can drive those households back into poverty. Chile is known for earthquakes
that can wreak large scale damage even in the most adapted cities. The lack of a robust social
net will mean that a large share of the population could fall into poverty in the case of a large
earthquake.
The top 10% of Chile's population captured 40% of its income in 2009, while the
bottom 20% captured only 3.6% of the total income. For this reason Chile ranks very high in
the Gini coefficient among its South American neighbors. Acemoglu (2012) illustrated how an
elite capture of a country will result in lower institutional quality and then to a reduction in
the country GDP and other measurements of prosperity. The case of Chile however provides
anecdotal evidence of the opposite. High and persistent inequality, combined with a large
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reduction in institutional quality stemming from the Pinochet coup and repression should have
resulted in a basketcase country. In the case of Chile both of those thing did not stop the
country from growing and eventually joining OECD. It is possible that elite capture of
resources and the deterioration in institutional quality happens over many decades and the past
20 years of democracy in Chile is not a long enough time horizon to see any significant effects.
The problem of inequality is compounded by a very regressive tax system that heavily favors
the rich over the poor and middle income citizens. The following Table 4 from Lopez(2007)
provides an overview of the skewed tax system that provides 81% of tax loopholes to the top
5% of the income distribution.

The social compact in Chile promised high economic growth and targeted social
programs for the poor in exchange for persistent high inequality. Pre 1970s the aim of
economic development in Chile was social modernization and general industrialization. To
achieve this aim public education, urban housing and public health infrastructure were
emphasized. After the Pinochet coup the development goals of Chile were changed to closely
follow the Washington Consensus. The goal of development was shifted from reducing
inequality to reducing poverty. Privatization in all aspects of economic life was mandated.
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Lagos and her successor Bachelet set out to change the goal of economic development
in Chile by focusing on increasing social protection. The first aspect was reform of the anti
poverty program Chile Solidario. This program provided cash assistance to some 300,000
families and also worked with those families to meet certain conditions over a two year period.
The education law implemented by the Pinochet regime was called Ley Organica
Constitucional de Educacion (LOCE). The aim of that law was to privatize the educational
system in Chile as much as possible. This resulted in a two tiered system with underfunded
public schools for the poor and middle income people and a private school system for the
wealthy. This resulted in university students being responsible for upto 80% of their tuition
and fees. Student unions like Federacion de Estudiantes de Chile and Federacion de Estudiantes
de la Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile protested this segregated system of education.
Such a tiered system helps maintain the high inequality in Chile by denying poor and middle
income students the opportunity for upward mobility through educational achievement. Efforts
to reform this system were met with pushback from neoliberal forces in Chile, as the voucher
system used in LOCE was the brain child of Milton Friedman. This voucher system split the
educational system into three parts. Public schools, voucher subsidized schools and fully private
schools.
Following massive student strikes in 2006 and 2011 president Bachelet introduced new
laws governing education in Chile. Her reforms did not address the core stratification of the
education system, but merely provided larger educational subsidies for low income and middle
income households. The new subsidy covers preschool and primary school fees.
The Pinochet regime introduced privatization into the healthcare sector by dividing it
into public and private parts. The public part, FONASA, insured access to healthcare for all.
The poor people do not pay for their treatment in FONASA facilities. FONASA system is
characterized by long waiting lines and under funded facilities. The private part is called
ISAPRES and the fees for treatment are calculated based on the recipient's income. Healthcare
sector underwent reform under the socialist governments of Lagos and Bachelet. The goal of
this reform , titled AUGE, was to increase preventative treatment and increase access to
treatment for lower and middle income Chileans. The military in Chile has its own health care
service.
Another important social net that was destroyed by the Pinochet regime was the
Chilean Pension system. The pension system was privatized with reliance on voluntary
contributions as the main source of funding for each person's retirement. This arrangement
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favored people in high paying white collar jobs over the majority of Chileans employed in small
and medium businesses. The individual has to make at least 20 years of contributions to receive
a minimum pension under this system. The privatized retirement system did contribute to the
development of financial markets in Chile. Bachelet introduced reform that gave persons age 65
and over supplementary pension if they met certain criteria. This was done to help the poor
people that do not receive a pension. Once again the military is exempt from the private pension
system.
Since the restoration of Democracy , the military has enjoyed a privileged status in
Chile. The command in chief of the Chilean army is not accountable to the civilian oversight.
The military used to receive a set 10% of the revenues from the state owned copper company,
CODELCO. This arrangement ended in 2009. Now the military is budgeted a nominal sum.
This was done at the request of the military, because it wanted a stable source of revenue for
its funding.
The Chilean experience of political instability is common in South America. Argentina
has experienced repeated cycles of political turmoil from 1960 all the way up to 1990. Ecuador
has experienced instability from 1960 to 1980. The Dominican Republic has experienced
instability in the 1960s.
Chile ranks high in common measurements of good governance as defined by the
World Bank. On the measurements of Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption Chile ranks much
higher than its South American neighbors. For this reason Foreign Direct Investment has been
an important part of copper mining sector's development in Chile. More recently FDI has
flown into a variety of South American countries. Most of that investment has been into
petroleum, natural gas and mineral production. In Chile Chinese FDI has been directed solely
at the copper mining center.(Barton, 2009) Neoliberal reforms guaranteed private property
rights and made Chile a relatively safer place for FDI than Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
(Hogenboom, 2010; Kirby, 2010)
Dézalay and Garth (2002) found that the “technocrat' class in Chile played a key role in
the democratization process. This “technocrat” class is made up of the elite with high academic
and professional achievement. According to Silva (1991, 2008) the “technocrat” class maintains
strong influence on the public through Think Tanks. For this reason the stratified educational
system and non-elected senators are the main mechanisms that the elites in Chile have to
maintain their position.
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Chile has very low rate of investment into Research and Development. On average
Chile spends about 0.5% of its GDP on R&D while other countries like Korea spend 2.6%, and
Ireland spends 2.6%. The private sector in Chile does not contribute enough to Research and
Development compared to other countries. In Sweden the private sector contributed 70% of all
R&D, while in Chile the figure is only 26%. (Gregorio, 2005)
A.4 Copper Exports and Inflation in Chile
The main findings of my paper are confirmed in the case of Chile. An increase in the
price of copper leads to a decrease in inflation. The following figure from Desormeaux(2009)
shows that positive terms of trade shocks in Chile are negatively correlated with the inflation
rate.

My analysis looks at the impact of raw commodity exports. Terms of trade is
calculated by looking the price of exported goods as a ratio of imported goods. In the case of
Chile, copper represents 50% of the exported goods, thus the terms of trade closely resembles
my analysis of the Commodity Price Index. From the previous figure one can see that the rise
in copper prices from 2003 to 2005 resulted in a reduction of the inflation rate from 5% to 0%.
While a reduction in the price of copper from 2006 to 2009 resulted in an increase in CPI
inflation during the same period.
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Desormeaux(2009) models both pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The
following findings from Desormeaux(2009) suggest that Chile is engaged in counter-cyclical
fiscal policy.

A.4 Conclusion
Chile is an example of a middle income trap, where a country develops rapidly using
commodity exports and then fails to transition to a fully developed economy. There are pockets
of promise such as Chile's integration into the global economy, well developed financial
markets at home and good governance as measured by the World Bank. However to
successfully transition from a largely resource driven economy to a modern developed economy
several crucial changes must be made to areas of inequality, education and political inclusion.
The biggest hindrance to this process is the stratified educational system. The stranglehold of
the neoliberal elite on the economy and political discussion in Chile hinders any significant
change in course. The fundamentalist neoliberal policies and the fear of straying from their
prescribed path stifles discourse on important issues of social safety nets, equality of
opportunity and public infrastructure investment. Heavy reliance on a single raw commodity
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exporting industry does not foster job growth or technological transfer to other sectors of the
economy. Learning to dig holes in the ground does not spur development of a manufacturing
sector. Neoliberal fundamentalism also prohibits public investment into needed infrastructure,
both physical and educational.
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